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Styleless Style? What Photorealism
Can Tell Us about “the Sixties”
CRAIG J . PEARISO
This essay reads s “photorealist” painting and its critical reception against two sets of
contemporary social analyses. First, it places these artistic and critical works next to Pierre
Bourdieu’s  text Photography: A Middle-Brow Art, demonstrating that, although the critical
literature surrounding “photorealism” tended to assume that its involvement with photography
grew out of a desire for an objective realism, contemporary thought on photography was
anything but convinced of the medium’s transparency. Second, it looks to cultural critics like
Susan Sontag and Jacob Brackman to propose that, rather than seeing the art of this period in
opposition to the heated political battles of “the sixties,” the presumably “styleless” works of
artists like Robert Bechtle and Ralph Goings may lead us to reconsider the forms of those battles
themselves.
In his essay “Photographic Guilt: The Painter and the Camera,” Jonathan
Weinberg suggests that the diﬀerence between Robert Bechtle’s paintings and
the documentary photographs of Robert Frank lies primarily in Bechtle’s
evasiveness. “Bechtle’s covered cars are far more diﬃcult to read,” Weinberg
writes.
They do not take a clear moral position. Is he ridiculing America’s devotion to the
automobile? If one of Bechtle’s themes is the kind of bourgeois respectability
embodied by the carefully manicured homes and possessions of average Americans, the
viewer’s attitude toward that subject will be determined more by his or her own
nationality, social status, and ideological beliefs than by any editorializing on the part
of the artist.
The refusal by artists like Bechtle and other “photorealists” to editorialize was,
as one might expect, the source of an extended critical debate in the late
s and early s. Were these painted reproductions of photographs a
celebration of contemporary American life – the result of a populist “wish to
close the gap between the public vision and the artist’s vision” – or a comment
on its absurdity? Forty years later, to ask this question of works by painters
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 Jonathan Weinberg, “Photographic Guilt: The Painter and the Camera,” in Janet Bishop, ed.,
Robert Bechtle (Berkeley: University of California Press, ), –, .
H. D. Raymond, “Beyond Freedom, Dignity and Ridicule,” Arts Magazine, ,  (Feb. ),
reprinted in Gregory Battcock, Super Realism: A Critical Anthology (New York: E. P. Dutton
& Co., ), –, .
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like Bechtle, Ralph Goings, Malcolm Morley, Richard McLean, and others
seems perfectly understandable. After all, what could it have meant, at the
moment of such pronounced social and political turmoil, for a group of
painters to present, in the words of their critical champion Ivan Karp, “a
circumstantial evidence of seeing that does not prove involvement or belief:
neutralism as against nihilism”? Unfortunately, this is a question that
discussions of the work rarely, if ever, address. Weinberg, for example, argues
that the apparent “neutralism” of these images was actually a complex
negotiation of the art-historical dilemma facing painters in the s, a tactic
that succeeded in making photography “strange” by painstakingly reproducing
its images in the “dead” medium it had purportedly superseded. Useful as this
reading may be, however, it still fails to answer the question of these works’
relation to their broader historical context. Why might this group of painters
have taken such an interest in snapshots of American life just as that life had
begun to come under attack for its oppressive tendencies? What could it have
meant to cultivate a “styleless style,” to have distanced oneself from the
signiﬁers of “involvement or belief,” in a decade commonly associated with an
emphasis on authentic political commitment? Might this interrogation of
photography have been more than just an eﬀort to reopen the debate
surrounding the death of painting? By placing the works of the photorealists
and their critics next to s analyses of photography, objectivity, and
authenticity by authors like Pierre Bourdieu and Jacob Brackman, I hope to
oﬀer some sense of the potential signiﬁcance of the “stylelessness” these
painters seemed to pursue, and to show the ways in which their works might
shed new light on the social and political conﬂicts they so insistently avoided.
I
In some sense, the viewers of photorealist paintings must have been relieved.
In his  lecture “Critical Schizophrenia and the Intentionalist Method,”
Max Kozloﬀ pointed out that in the early s he and other critics had
become increasingly anxious about their own status in relation to works of art.
Clement Greenberg, Hilton Kramer, Leo Steinberg, Michael Fried: the
number of critics who seemed suddenly to be concerned with the viability of
their practice was remarkable. On one hand, Kozloﬀ suggested, it would be
 Ivan Karp, “Rent Is the Only Reality, or the Hotel Instead of the Hymns,” Arts Magazine, ,
 (Dec./Jan. ), reprinted in Battcock, –, .
The desire to cast the s as a decade of commitment/authenticity has persisted even in
more recent attempts to recast this period in American history. See, for example, Douglas C.
Rossinow’s The Politics of Authenticity: Liberalism, Christianity, and the New Left in America
(New York: Columbia University Press, ).
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foolish to assume that these critics’ discomfort was somehow removed from
the increasingly popular status of much contemporary art. As he put it, the
“greatly accelerated interest in art by laymen only emphasized by contrast the
evasion of responsibility by most critics. Nothing less than their leadership was
at stake.” However much these critics may have felt challenged by art’s new
audience, though, it was the art itself that proved their greatest bugbear. With
the emergence of movements like pop art and minimalism, “Nothing was
clearer than the inadequacy of the then-going critical apparatus.” Neither
formalist criticism, seeking to remain faithful to the pure optical data of the
work, nor its “poetic” counterpart, which looked to explicate the content of
aesthetic objects, seemed capable of dealing with the rising generation of artists
and their works. The paintings of Frank Stella appeared to “encourage, only to
reject, a certain kind of analysis,” and the ﬁlms, paintings, and even persona of
Andy Warhol read as if they had been “designed to invalidate” any attempt at
critical analysis. The only option available to the contemporary critic,
according to Kozloﬀ, was a speculative foray into the realm of artistic
intention. By maintaining a proper balance between “credulity and
incredulity,” the critic, Kozloﬀ argued, might eventually ferret out the artist’s
intentions, and thus come closer to determining the true “nature of the
object.”
Thus, when a number of painters began working directly from photographs,
their images seemed to provide critics with a clear, external standard. No
longer would one have to struggle to comprehend the internal formal logic of
the work, or to puzzle out the idiosyncrasies of an individual artist.
Photorealist paintings appeared to ask nothing of their audience other than
a comparison to the precise visual reproductions of the camera. Bechtle’s
meticulous renderings, for example, served to distance him from Bay Area
ﬁgurative painters like Richard Diebenkorn and David Park, both known for
their sensual handling of paint, and, in Diebenkorn’s case, an insistence on the
painter’s personal relation to his subject matter as crucial to the work’s success.
As Bechtle explained in , traditional realists and ﬁgurative painters were
really interested in the diﬀerence between the marks [they] can make on paper, even
though [they are] trying to be very accurate with it, and the thing itself. The subtle
distinctions that occur between what goes on paper and what actually exists there.
[They are] interested in that diﬀerence and I think we’re not. We try to eliminate that
diﬀerence as much as possible and resort to the camera to do it.
Max Kozloﬀ, “Critical Schizophrenia and the Intentionalist Method,” in Kozloﬀ, Renderings:
Critical Essays on a Century of Modern Art (New York: Simon and Schuster, ), .
 Ibid., .  Ibid., , .  Ibid., .
Quoted in Linda Chase, “Existential vs. Humanist Realism,” in Battcock, –, .
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The photorealists, in other words, only wanted what painters were assumed to
have been pursuing since the time of Zeuxis and Parrhasius: to create two-
dimensional images indistinguishable from the objects they depicted.
For Ivan Karp, along with a number of others, the attempt to erase this
distinction seemed incredibly progressive. Photorealist painting was successful,
he argued, because it allowed the beauty of even the most ordinary objects to
shine through: “just as a fresh, ripe, homegrown tomato seems suddenly so
terribly important [photorealism] may reawaken us to the dormant joys of
observation.” And as much as this assertion may make these paintings sound
nostalgic, Karp felt that this was at best only half the story. Certainly one could
ﬁnd in their works a longing for things past. But the loss these artists mourned
was not simply that of ﬁgurative representation, as was often assumed. If this
were the case, he argued, their works would have appeared far more
sentimental. To the contrary, these artists’ reliance on the camera had in
many ways negated that type of cathexis. They had looked not to evoke an
“emotional response,” but to treat objects as “emblem[s] representing nothing
but [themselves].” The photorealists, like anthropologists of the contem-
porary world, treated all things equally “in both their power and vacuity” in an
attempt to reintroduce viewers to the world around them. They had, it
seems, recognized the beauty in contemporary life, and the result was nothing
less than “a democratic triumph.”
For historian and critic Linda Nochlin, however, the result of the
photorealists’ professed desire for objectivity was a focus not on the things
depicted, but on the presence of the paintings themselves. In trying, and, more
importantly, failing, to replicate the mechanical vision of the camera, she argued,
the photorealists had oﬀered one of the ﬁrst truly new, and, more importantly,
truly contemporary developments in postwar American art. More than the pop
artists, who made use of popular imagery only to subordinate it to the formal
conventions of modernist abstraction, the “New Realists” had exploded
Clement Greenberg’s myth of modernist painting as a continuous progression
toward the work of artists like Frank Stella and Kenneth Noland –work that,
no matter what one might say regarding the “modernist” imperative of its
reduction of means, seemed to have little to say about contemporary modes of
perception. This, of course, is what the “New Realist” work oﬀered. If painters
like McLean, Audrey Flack, and others had attempted simply to resurrect
realism in its traditional form, to invoke “the meretricious mini-platitudes of a
self-styled ‘old’ realist like Andrew Wyeth,” their work would have been merely
Karp, –.  Ibid., .  Ibid., .
 Ibid., . H. D. Raymond echoed this sentiment when he later wrote that the photorealists
partook of a “nonelitist common denominator of shared interests with the public.” See
Raymond, “Beyond Freedom, Dignity, and Ridicule,” .
 Craig J. Peariso
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retardataire. Like their nineteenth-century predecessors, the “New Realists”
valued metonymy over metaphor, concerning themselves with the “accuracy of
‘meaningless’ detail” that would tie their works “so ﬁrmly to a speciﬁc time and a
speciﬁc place.” But this link to their “speciﬁc time” and “speciﬁc place” meant
that the “New Realism” would, at least on the surface, appear diﬀerent to the
work of earlier realists. Quite simply, realism in the s, insofar as its aim was
to present that which was “essential simply to being at a concrete historical
moment,” could not look like that of the s. The objects captured in these
paintings of photographs would obviously proclaim their contemporaneity
(think, for example, of Bechtle’s many paintings featuring late-model cars, or
Richard Estes’s city streets). But, more importantly, the unapologetic adoption
of photography asserted unmistakably that the artist’s eye had been
fundamentally transformed by the technological developments of her/his time.
The camera had so altered the individual’s relation to the world that any failure
to address that change –whether in the form of a spurious “old” realism or
monochrome abstraction – amounted to an act of either ignorance or stubborn
denial. By subordinating the will of the artist to the lens of the camera the “New
Realists” succeeded in making the “impress of the immediate present” instantly
recognizable.
Yet in her eagerness to highlight the underlying similarities she felt united
the “New Realists” and a painter like Courbet, Nochlin failed to mention
perhaps the most striking diﬀerence. Much as she seemed prepared to
condemn contemporary abstraction and the nostalgic “realism” of Andrew
Wyeth in the name of realism’s tradition of social and political commitment,
in her discussion of the “New Realists” Nochlin rather curiously allowed the
question of content to fall by the wayside. She repeatedly insisted that the use
of the camera was the primary distinction between the “New Realists” and
nineteenth-century realists like Courbet, framing their diﬀerences in terms of
technology rather than ideology. For this reason, while she pointed to
Courbet’s  Portrait of P.-J. Proudhon to illustrate realism’s presentation of
a “concrete rather than an ideal . . . reality,” she chose not to comment on the
political signiﬁcance of “concrete reality” in nineteenth-century political
thought. Instead, the essay turns to a discussion of the presentation of
“concrete reality” in contemporary cinema, stressing the relationship between
the “New Realist” painting and European “avant-garde” ﬁlm. Both painters
and ﬁlmmakers, she wrote,
avoid involvement with narrative theme or symbolic content, and resolutely exclude
any possibility of interpretation that would involve translating the visual “given” into
 Linda Nochlin, “Realism Now,” in Realism Now catalogue (Poughkeepsie, NY: Vassar
College Art Gallery, ), reprinted in Battcock, Super Realism, –, .
 Ibid., .  Ibid., .  Ibid., .  Ibid., .
Styleless Style?
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terms other than its own, or reducing it to a mere transparent surface for an all-
important “something more” lurking beneath. In both the New Realism and the
avant-garde cinema, the literalness of the imagery makes the art object dense and
opaque; anything that would tend to pierce through the presented surface and give rise
to narrative meaning or psychological implication is immediately put between
parentheses and thereby assimilated to the opaque, continuous surface that constitutes
the totality of the aesthetic statement.
That is to say, one should not waste time looking for any identiﬁable
meaning in these images. Whatever the “New Realism” might reveal about
contemporary modes of perception, its true signiﬁcance lay in its literal
impenetrability, its tendency to render form and content indistinguishable.
These paintings and ﬁlms invited the viewer to leave interpretation behind
and to attend strictly to matters of form. As Nochlin explained, mis-
interpretations, or “overinterpretations,” of these works should be seen as the
result of “an inveterate tendency to reduce form to a kind of handy, disposable
container for content.” Only through careful attention to the images
themselves could these works be understood. In the end, therefore, the point
of “New Realist” painting, at least according to Nochlin, was not to document
the existence of its chosen objects, but, by faithfully reproducing the
appearance of those objects, to assert the objectivity of the painting itself.
The works’ ambiguity was the result of these artists’ attempt to forestall
interpretation. Their reintroduction of “subject matter” in this fashion was
not so much about bringing recognizable content back into the work of art,
 Ibid., –.
 Ibid., . Nochlin’s argument regarding the “New Realism” in art and ﬁlm here closely
resembles the contemporary writings of art and literary critic Susan Sontag. In the collection
of essays entitled Against Interpretation, ﬁrst published in , Sontag argued that in the
th century the relationship between the critic and the work of art had become strained
because the critic no longer respected the work’s objectivity. “In most modern instances,” she
wrote, criticism simply rendered art “manageable, conformable.” By oﬀering interpretations of
artworks the critic implied that form and content were distinct, thereby violating the work,
separating it from itself. In response to this critical misunderstanding, Sontag argued that
modern artists had begun to make works that thwarted any and all attempts at interpretation
by appealing directly to the senses. Artists from Antonin Artaud to Michelangelo Antonioni
had sought to “elude the interpreters . . . by making works of art whose surface is so uniﬁed
and clean, whose momentum is so rapid, whose address is so direct that the work can
be . . . just what it is.” The value of these works, she argued, was that they deﬁed translation.
They forced one to acknowledge the work’s “pure, untranslatable, sensuous immediacy . . .
and its . . . solutions to certain problems of . . . form.” Susan Sontag, “Against Interpretation,”
in Sontag , Against Interpretation (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, ), , . For a
closer reading of Sontag’s art criticism in the s, see Craig J. Peariso, “The ‘Counter
Culture’ in Quotes: Sontag and Marcuse on the Work of Revolution,” in Barbara Ching and
Jennifer Wagner-Lawler, eds., The Scandal of Susan Sontag (New York: Columbia University
Press, ), –.
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but about pressing the world of recognizable things into the service of aesthetic
form.
Much as Nochlin’s reading of the “New Realism” appears to clash with
Karp’s, the two are nonetheless united in one important way. In their haste to
portray these artists’ use of the camera as an attempt to celebrate the beauty of
the everyday, to approximate contemporary modes of perception or the
existence of objects, or simply to deny our eﬀorts to interpret the resulting
images, neither of these critics thought to question the relationship between
photography and objectivity. Looking back on these discussions more than
thirty years later, this seems almost surprising. For, as Jonathan Crary, Alan
Sekula, and others have since made clear, the presumed objectivity of
photographs has never been entirely self-evident. Yet even without the
beneﬁt of more recent histories of the medium, there is something odd about
these authors’ willingness to let the objectivity of an imaging technology
go unquestioned. After all, in , the same year that Kozloﬀ struggled to
pin down some model of artistic intention, sociologist Pierre Bourdieu
assailed popular assumptions regarding photography’s status as an “objective
representation” of the material world, seeking instead to theorize what he
called the “photographic intention.”
II
For Bourdieu, the photographic intention was to be located not in the
individual will of any particular photographer, but in the social ﬁeld itself.
Simply put, as an imaging technology, photography highlighted the historical
constraints on the forms of subjective expression. To understand photography,
he argued, one must not rely on psychological analyses seeking to explain the
practice in terms of individual motives or desires, for that approach enabled
one “to penetrate no further than psychological functions as they are
experienced, that is, to penetrate no further than ‘satisfactions’ and ‘reasons’,
instead of investigating the social functions concealed by those ‘reasons’, and
whose fulﬁllment moreover procures directly experienced ‘satisfactions.’ ”
Though one might anticipate that photography, “which has no tradition and
makes no demands,” would be the medium of individual improvisation,
according to Bourdieu photographic practice could not be more formulaic.
The distinguishing characteristic of photography, he argued, was not its
 See Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: Vision and Modernity in the th Century
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, ); and Alan Sekula, “The Body and the Archive,” October,
 (Winter ), –.
 Pierre Bourdieu, Photography: A Middle-Brow Art (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
), .  Ibid., .
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democratization of artistic expression, but the way in which individuals
holding cameras tended to see only a limited number of objects and scenes as
photographable. The images produced thus presented neither subjective
expression nor “realistic” or “objective” copies of nature. They were instead the
results of a socially delimited practice of “selection, and . . . transcription.”
“Photography,” he wrote, “is considered to be a perfectly realistic and objective
recording of the visible world because (from its origin) it has been assigned
social uses that are held to be ‘realistic’ and ‘objective.’” Thus the point of his
analysis was not to ignore questions of form, but to demonstrate the ways that,
“whether in its rhythms, its instruments or its aesthetic, the social function
that allows [photography] to exist also deﬁnes the limits of its existence.”
The aesthetics of photography were inseparable from the images’ social
eﬃcacy. To comprehend this point, one needed only think of the sheer
number of images that seemed to reproduce the “strained, posed and
stereotyped photography of the family album.” No matter how the
individual photographer felt about the stilted, standardized images s/he
produced, taking formulaic pictures of reunions, weddings, birthdays, etc.,
nevertheless appeared to be “just as inevitable as the . . . ceremonies [those
pictures] solemnized.”
In her  essay “A Note on Photography and the Simulacral,” Rosalind
Krauss takes issue with Bourdieu’s apparently reductive treatment of
photographic aesthetics. The sociologist’s treatment of photography, she
contends, fails to come to terms with its true importance as a medium because,
in spite of his quarrel with those who simplistically equate the camera with
objectivity, his analysis nevertheless assumes that pictures are in some
important way transparent. That is, he treats the photographs he encounters,
whether they function as records of a family gathering or as amateurish
imitations of paintings, as simple social indices, never once considering that
the medium itself may in fact be the source of its own peculiar aesthetic logic.
Or, one might say, its own peculiarly anti-aesthetic logic. For the importance
of photography, in Krauss’s analysis, lies in its ability to collapse the traditional
assumptions of aesthetic theory “from within.” The photograph’s status as a
reproduced image, she explains,
joins the theoretical possibility that all images taken of the same object could end up
being the same image and thus partake of sheer repetition. Together these forms of
multiplicity cut deeply against the notion of originality as an aesthetic condition
available to photographic practice. Within the aesthetic universe of diﬀerentiation –
which is to say: “this is good, this is bad, this, in its absolute originality, is diﬀerent
from that” – within this universe photography raises the specter of nondiﬀerentiation
 Ibid., – (italics in original).  Ibid., .
 Ibid., .  Ibid., .
 Craig J. Peariso
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at the level of qualitative diﬀerence and introduces instead the condition of a merely
quantitative array of diﬀerences, as in a series.
Resisting the common temptation to dismiss the reproductive or repetitive as
simply “derivative,” Krauss suggests that the conceptual link between photo-
graphy and reproducibility in fact constitutes the camera’s most important
contribution to contemporary art and critical thought. Photography’s
signiﬁcance lies in its tendency to evacuate the language of classical aesthetics,
revealing the tendentiousness of any judgment of quality, originality, and so
on. It “deconstructs” art, distancing it from itself to show the impossibility of
separating artistic form from the stereotypical or “culturally already-given.”
In chastising Bourdieu for overlooking the possibility of a “discourse proper
to photography,” however, Krauss neglects a crucial moment in his essay. In
discussing the standardized, rigidly frontal poses of family photographs – just
when the reader expects him to argue that photography demonstrates the ways
in which the self, insofar as it is always social, is inseparable from the position it
occupies in a particular ﬁeld – Bourdieu indicates that the pose may be a form
of self-fashioning. The pose constitutes “the extreme form of [the sitters’]
relationship to others,” he writes; it is the sitters’ attempt to control the way in
which others perceive them:
faced with a look which captures and immobilizes appearances, adopting the most
ceremonial bearing means reducing the risk of clumsiness and gaucherie and giving
others an image of oneself that is aﬀected and pre-deﬁned. Like respect for etiquette,
frontality is a means of eﬀecting one’s own objectiﬁcation: oﬀering a regulated image
of oneself is a way of imposing the rules of one’s own perception . . . How, under these
conditions, could the representation of society be anything other than the
representation of a represented society?
In attempting to ﬁx the identity of the sitter, the photograph, insofar as it is
determined by its social function, paradoxically opens up the possibility of
her/his nonidentity. The pose, ultimately an apotropaic gesture, seemed to
hold the potential to turn the “photographic intention” back on itself.
It revealed the extent to which photography’s objectivity was both a function
of its social utility, and always necessarily incomplete. Any attempt to oﬀer an
exhaustive account of the “photographic intention,” therefore, would founder
on the pose, yielding in the end only uncertainty. The “deconstructive”
approach to the performance of self that Krauss found so fascinating in the
work of Cindy Sherman was, as Bourdieu recognized, already at work in the
photos of birthdays, anniversaries, and weddings he so detested.
 Rosalind Krauss, “A Note on Photography and the Simulacral,” October,  (Winter ),
–, –.  Ibid., .  Ibid., –.
This aspect of Bourdieu’s argument, as many readers will have noticed, also anticipates
the issues taken up  years later by Craig Owens in his essays “The Medusa Eﬀect, or,
Styleless Style?
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This recognition, of course, only serves to raise once again the question of
historical context. While photography provided an occasion for thinking
through the conceptual trickiness of posing, it would be a mistake to
dehistoricize this “deconstructive” potential of the pose as a necessary eﬀect of
the camera’s invention. In the s, after all, as Kozloﬀ’s essay makes clear,
posing was common outside the photographic frame as well: virtually any
individual or object one submitted to critical analysis eventually slipped
through one’s ﬁngers. For this reason it is interesting to note that, as Bourdieu
and Kozloﬀ struggled to pin down their respective models of photographic
and artistic intention – each one ﬁnding, in a tidy rehearsal of the Lacanian
dialectic of the gaze, that the closer he came to the stereotypical or the
individual, the more each of those concepts tended to pass over into its
opposite – ﬁlm critic Jacob Brackman wrote that the “put-on,” a pervasive
form of ironic self-presentation, had “clog[ged]” critical judgment and “scuttle
[d]” aesthetic standards.
In the late s, Brackman argued, the put-on had become something like
a standard form of (mis)communication. “By means of a subtle transformation
in the way artists deal with their public and people with one another,” he
wrote, “we suddenly have reason to distrust a good deal of art, fashion, and
conversation – to withhold a ﬂat-footed response. More and more often, we
suspect we are being tricked.” Where earlier practices like “kidding” or
“joshing” presented untruths as truths only to reveal the ruse within a few
moments – and thus call attention to the victim’s gullibility – the “put-on
artist” was more likely to continue his/her performance indeﬁnitely:
The put-on is an open-end form. That is to say, it is rarely climaxed by having the
“truth” set straight – when a truth, indeed, exists. “Straight” discussion, when one of
the participants is putting the others on, is soon subverted and eventually sabotaged by
uncertainty.
The put-on artist, whether agreeing or disagreeing, merely recited a series of
clichés. S/he seemed intent only on turning communication into a guessing
game: the put-on “inherently cannot be understood.” Refusing to speak in
the name of truth or an authentic self-identity, the put-on artist appeared
merely to revel in her/his ability to evade the listener. Regardless of the
perpetrator or the form, the result was nearly always the same. Rather than
revealing an individual’s “true” position, the put-on suggested the dubiousness
The Spectacular Ruse,” and “Posing.” See Craig Owens, Beyond Recognition: Representation,
Power, and Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, ), –.
 Jacob Brackman, The Put-on: Modern Fooling and Modern Mistrust (Chicago: Henry Regnery
Co., ), .  Ibid., .
 Ibid.,  (emphasis in original).  Ibid.,  (emphasis in original).
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of any “true” position. It rendered the stereotypical aspect of all positions
palpable, thereby setting “straight” conversation adrift.
In the world of art, as Kozloﬀ indicates, the popularity of the put-on had
brought about a fundamental shift in the way audiences approached the latest
works. Viewers had come to assume that a great deal of contemporary work
sought to engage them not in some type of purely sensual communion, but in
an elaborate “con game.” In response, Brackman suggests, critical arguments
seemed to shift from determining what qualiﬁed as a “good” work to what
constituted a “real” work. In this situation, of course, when a critic dismisses
something that others have considered good, he is no longer simply challenging the
merits of a speciﬁc work; he is telling the public that his colleagues have been taken in
by fraud, that they are hoodwinked in their notions of what constitutes art, that none
of us really knows for sure anymore what is real and good.
Much like the interlocutor, forced to withhold her consent for fear of having
been taken in by a conversational put-on, the cultural critic found her
judgment rendered unstable as well.
For this reason, it is interesting to note the way in which Brackman
explained the put-on’s historical origin. This set of practices, he argued, had
sprung directly from Susan Sontag’s  piece “Notes on Camp.” Her
“disjunct essay in Partisan Review . . . was read by tens of thousands, but its
reverberations aﬀected the culture consumed by hundreds of millions.”
What, in the early s, had been preserved within the “classy preconscious”
of American culture, surfaced in the wake of Sontag’s essay as a mode of
“popular consciousness.” That which had once been “an outlaw form was
rapidly institutionalized”; what Sontag had described only as “a method of
appreciation” had been taken up as “principles of manufacture.” Long before
Madonna “struck a pose” and introduced a mass audience to voguing, the put-
on had popularized the theatrically queer sensibility of camp. In the process,
Brackman argued, that sensibility had been turned into a series of pointless
jokes, a self-defeating evasiveness that undercut any attempt at meaningful
dialogue. Brackman, anticipating the later work of Peter Sloterdijk, worried
that irony had become the contemporary form of ideology. Unfortunately for
Brackman, what he saw as the negative social and political eﬀects of the put-on
were not so easily stanched. Not unlike Sontag, who feared that her own
attempt to come to terms with the “Camp sensibility” would result only in
“a very inferior piece of Camp,” Brackman quickly discovered that any attempt
to regain one’s footing, to understand the put-on’s relation to Camp by
imposing the standard conceptual framework of a pioneering avant-garde and
an imitative kitsch, was destined to fail. For, as Fabio Cleto has since pointed
 Ibid., .  Ibid., .  Ibid., .
 Susan Sontag, “Notes on Camp,” in Sontag, Against Interpretation, .
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out, the inability to maintain this distinction was one of the deﬁning
characteristics of American culture in the s. If anything, as Cleto puts it,
by depicting camp as the dominant sensibility of that era, Sontag’s “Notes”
ultimately succeeded in describing the peculiar historical paradox in which the
“‘democratic’ leveling of social (and cultural) hierarchies” seemed to be viewed
with an oddly “aristocratic” detachment. The sociohistorical context in
which camp emerged, the same conditions that enabled its popularization in
the form of the put-on, thus made it impossible to right one’s critical ship
simply by reasserting the value of immediacy. For, as Sontag’s, and later
Nochlin’s, diﬃculties made clear, no one could be certain what immediacy
really was. Calls for meaningful dialogue, “sensuous immediacy,” and even
“kynicism” will ultimately run aground on this very diﬃculty. Everything, to
paraphrase Sontag, has been placed “in quotation marks” – not by camp or the
put-on, but by the peculiarities of postwar American culture.
To be sure, if this had remained the problem of a few art critics, it would
most likely merit little discussion. What makes the unavoidability of the put-
on interesting is precisely the fact that it was not merely the problem of a few
determined formalists. The put-on’s cynical irony had tainted virtually every
interpersonal exchange. One did not simply reenter the realm of sincerity by
stepping outside the gallery. For this reason, Brackman’s argument implies that
any attempt to speak of “the sixties” without accounting for these tactics of
misdirection would be foolhardy. To oﬀer just one example, consider perhaps
the most common target of criticism in discussions of late s political
activism: the sexist, homophobic rhetoric associated with the struggle for Black
Power. From Eldridge Cleaver’s infamous critique of James Baldwin to LeRoi
Jones’s claim that “Most American white men are trained to be fags,” the
Black Power politics of that era have been cast repeatedly as guided by an
unquestioned faith in the power of black masculinity.
When placed next to Brackman’s analysis of the put-on, however, this
overwrought machismo no longer seems so straightforward. Indeed, in
describing one of the most common forms of the put-on, the actualization of a
 Fabio Cleto, “Introduction,” in Cleto , ed., Camp: Queer Aesthetics and the Performing Subject
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, ), .
 For examples of this, see, among others, Michele Wallace, Black Macho and the Myth of the
Superwoman (New York: Verso Press, ); Kobena Mercer and Isaac Julien, “True
Confessions,” in Ten., ,  (), –, Robyn Wiegman, “The Anatomy of Lynching,”
in Wiegman, American Anatomies: Theorizing Race and Gender (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, ), –; and Leerom Medovoi, “A Yippie-Panther Pipe Dream:
Rethinking Sex, Race, and the Sexual Revolution,” in Hilary Radner and Moya Luckett, eds.,
Swinging Single: Representing Sexuality in the s (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, ), –.
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stereotype, Brackman depicts a conversation between a “benevolent progress-
ive” and a “militant Negro” in which
the perpetrator personiﬁes every cliché about his group, realizes his adversary’s every
negative expectation. He becomes a grotesque rendition of his presumed identity . . .
[saying] “Don’t make your superego gig with me, ofay baby. Your graddaddy rape my
grandmammy, and now you tell me doan screw your daughter? . . . don’t oﬀer me none
of the supreme delectafactotory blessings of equalorama, ’cause when this bitch blows
you gonna feel the black man’s machete in the soft ﬂesh of your body, dig?”
Though Brackman asks us to read this as a cynical joke at the expense of the
“benevolent progressive,” this embodiment of racist stereotypes was performed
not as a signiﬁer of some simplistic belief in the power of an “authentic”
blackness, but a complex exercise in self-representation. It was, one might say, a
way of posing as “black.” In this sense, in spite of his obvious disdain for these
tactics, Brackman’s depiction may oﬀer us an opportunity not only to rethink
the rhetoric and personae of Black Power spokesmen like Cleaver and Jones,
but also to revisit any number of other curious moments in the history of that
movement, from H. Rap Brown’s extended meditation on “playing the
dozens” with America to Huey Newton’s admiration for the cleverly elusive
signiﬁcations of Sweet Sweetback’s Baadasssss Song. And this, again, is just one
example. The antiwar movement, the counterculture, gay liberation: virtually
every grassroots, oppositional movement commonly associated with “the
sixties” presented, in Brackman’s eyes, yet another case of the kind of
unresolvable misdirection he found so frustrating.
And although the work of the photorealists was, at least on its surface, quite
diﬀerent from these performances of politics, it is important to recognize that
both ultimately problematize the assumed objectivity of contemporary
imaging technologies. Once again, paintings like those of Bechtle, Goings,
and others appeared to foreground the tension between the photographic and
the handmade. Though they drew quite obviously on the types of subject
matter and compositions found in family photographs, the paintings
themselves were still nearly impossible to mistake for photographs. The
slight diﬀerences or “imperfections” that marked them as something like an
operation of paraphrasing – simpliﬁed colors, shadows, reﬂections, omitted
 Brackman, The Put-on, –.
 See H. Rap Brown, Die Nigger Die! A Political Autobiography (Chicago: Lawrence Hill
Books, ), –; Huey P. Newton, “He Won’t Bleed Me: A Revolutionary Analysis of
Sweet Sweetback’s Baadasssss Song,” in Newton, To Die For the People (New York: Writers and
Readers Publishing, ), –.
A thorough discussion of Brackman’s various examples is beyond the scope of this paper. For
more on the put-on as it relates to activism see Craig J. Peariso, “Re/Citing: Radical Activism
in Late-s America” (PhD dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook,
).
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details, and so on – were the very things that enabled them to, in Weinberg’s
terms, make photography strange. This seems to have been precisely what
J. Patrice Mandel was driving at when he proposed to label these artists “new
ﬁgurative painters” rather than photorealists, “New Realists,” super realists, or
any other name that might indicate a concern for “reality” in their works.
Their images seemed to want neither to present some form of trompe l’oeil
illusionism, nor to capture an objective “truth” kept hidden in our daily
experience. If anything, Mandel suggested, these “new ﬁgurative painters” had
forbidden the viewer to mistake anything presented in their images for reality.
In spite of the purportedly literal mimesis of their paintings, the amount of
information that appeared on the canvas was almost always less than what was
contained in the photographic source. Elements of the original image would
be saved or discarded based on their role in the painting’s composition. What
was left could thus only be described as a “deductive image,” one in which
“what is left out of the picture is . . . almost as important as what is put in.”
What passed for “realism” in the mid-twentieth century, therefore, was nothing
more than a process of abstraction. And these artists, recognizing their inability
to “discover reality,” had chosen to engage in an elaborate series of tricks in
which “the more accurate the picture seems, the more imaginative it is.”
And while Brackman never makes the connection explicit, many of the put-
ons he disparages as a form of pseudopolitics were developed in response to the
media’s claims to represent the truth of alternative cultures and grassroots
movements. As many others have already made clear, most Americans’
knowledge of the various forms of contemporary oppositional political activity
was shaped not through ﬁrsthand experience, but by the almost daily barrage
of media imagery depicting protests, demonstrations, and so on. In the late
s, images of opposition were a staple of the budding infotainment
industry. For this reason, it is understandable that most historians’ discussions
of the mass media’s relationship with grassroots politics have focussed on the
power of a medium like television to undermine the political potential of
virtually any movement it touched – its ability to “make and unmake”
movements, to use Todd Gitlin’s famous phrasing. Yet in doing so, these
authors portray the activists in question as something like the naive victims of
media manipulation, too simplistically sincere in their commitment to a given
political position and/or so convinced that the audience would understand
and identify with their message that they were unable to recognize the
dangers in speaking to reporters. The possibility that these individuals
 J. Patrice Mandel, “The Deductive Image,” in Battcock, Super Realism, –, .
 Ibid., , .
 See Todd Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of
the New Left (Berkeley: University of California Press, ).
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may have wanted something other than a form of straightforward mass
communication – that they may have wanted, as Abbie Hoﬀman once wrote,
to be a cross between Fidel Castro and Andy Warhol – is rarely considered.
Brackman’s text thus holds profound implications not just for our under-
standing of the art of the late s, but for a great deal of what we now accept
as the truth of “the sixties.”
Viewing the works of photorealists like Bechtle through the lens of the put-
on allows us to see that their artistic and ideological indeterminacy may not
have been the result of their apparently “styleless style,” but of their tendency
to foreground the stylistic aspect of all forms of “objective representation.” At
the same time, if, as Brackman suggests, the queer logic of the put-on was at
work in much of the grassroots activism of that decade, then the assumed
disconnect between the heated politics of the late s and the apparently
noncommittal works of some of that era’s best-known artists can no longer be
maintained. Moreover, the key to understanding the connections between
those artists and activists lies neither in looking for the moments of
“commitment” in works previously labeled “apolitical,” nor in simply
translating the rhetoric of activist politics into the terms of formalist
criticism. A more productive contribution to our understanding of the visual
culture of late-s America might be found, as Brackman’s argument
indicates, in seeking out those moments when both art and grassroots politics
seemed to acknowledge the impossibility of their own immediacy or
“authenticity,” those moments when each one appeared to engage in an
extended critique of truth and power. What might performances of a
stereotypical “radicalism,” like the photorealists’ enactment of the clichéd
desire for illusion in painting, reveal about the status of opposition in the late
s? Photorealist painting seemed to want to make the conventions of
“objective representation” strange. It is high time that we, as historians, begin
to make “the sixties” strange, recognizing the imbrications of earnestness and
play, “direct action” and performance, “straight conversation” and camp, and
art and activism that cause any attempt to apprehend the “reality” of that era
to fall short.
 Free [Abbie Hoﬀman], Revolution for the Hell of It (New York: Dial Press, ), .
Ultimately, this is the solution oﬀered by David Joselit’s recent work on art, activism, and
television in the s. In spite of Joselit’s commendable desire “to contribute to the social
and political debates of our time,” his analysis too often assumes those debates to be settled,
taking conventional notions of “the sixties” at face value. Thus, for example, he recounts the
ways in which the “visual culture of psychedelia was devoted to dissolving objects into
networks of optical pulsion,” without interrogating the apparent signiﬁcance of concepts like
psychedelia and dissolution in American culture. See David Joselit, “Yippie Pop: Abbie
Hoﬀman, Andy Warhol and s Media Politics,” Grey Room,  (Summer ), –; and
Joselit, Feedback: Television against Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, ).
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